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Abstract
The development of eHealth systems has brought great convenience to people’s
life. Researchers have been combining new technologies to make eHealth systems
work better for patients. The Blockchain-based eHealth system becomes pop-
ular because of its unique distributed tamper-resistant and privacy-preserving
features. However, due to the security issues of the blockchain system, there
are many security risks in eHealth systems utilizing the blockchain technology.
i.e. 51% attacks can destroy blockchain-based systems. Besides, trivial trans-
actions and frequent calls of smart contracts in the blockchain system bring
additional costs and security risks to blockchain-based eHealth systems. Worse
still, electronic medical records (EMRs) are controlled by medical institutions
rather than patients, which causes privacy leakage issues. In this paper, we pro-
pose a medical data Sharing and Privacy-preserving eHealth system based on
blockChain technology (SPChain). We combine RepuCoin with the SNARKs-
based chameleon hash function to resist underlying blockchain attacks, and
design a new chain structure to make microblocks contribute to the weight of
blockchain. The system allows patients to share their EMRs among different
medical institutions in a privacy-preserving way. Besides, authorized medical
institutions can label wrong EMRs with the patients’ permissions in the case of
misdiagnosis. Security analysis and performance evaluation demonstrate that
the proposed system can provide a strong security guarantee with a high effi-
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1. Introduction
The era of big data brings new opportunities and challenges to medical
field. Researchers have found that the dissemination of medical data has been
perceived to be a breakthrough for the discovery of new techniques and therapies
for curing diseases. Through the analysis of medical data, many diseases can
be effectively prevented and treated. i.e., artificial intelligence techniques are
utilized on diagnostics in glaucoma [1], hyperactivity [2], and Parkinson’s disease
[3] via medical data sharing and analysis.
In order to provide a more efficient and flexible service for both patients and
medical institutions, eHealth systems are proposed to save, manage, transmit
and reproduce digital patient medical records. Currently, eHealth systems are
mainly divided into traditional central server-based eHealth systems and cloud-
based eHealth systems. In traditional central server-based eHealth systems,
EMRs are stored in a single server controlled by a medical institution. In this
circumstance, medical data sharing is difficult and inefficient, and privacy leak-
age problems arise frequently since patients lose control of their medical data.
What’s worse, once the central server goes down, the medical data will be lost,
and it will be difficult to retrieve the data.
As for cloud-based eHealth systems, medical institutions outsource EMRs
to cloud servers. The migration of medical records to cloud-based platforms
[4] has facilitated the sharing of medical data between healthcare and research
institutions, enabling faster and more convenient exchange in a manner previ-
ously not possible. However, guaranteeing the integrity and confidentiality of
the outsourced medical data is a daunting task. Moreover, patients need to
register repeatedly in different medical institutions, which brings trivial records
to patients. Worse still, the privacy of patients is still a blank check signed
by medical institutions. In recent years, many accidents about medical records
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leakages [5] [6] [7] have occurred frequently. Therefore, eHealth systems crave
innovations to assure the security and privacy of medical records.
Blockchain, which is widely leveraged in cyptocurrency systems [8], [9], is
a promising technology that can be used to maintain a transparent ledger and
share data among participants. With the tamper-resistant and distributed na-
ture, the blockchain technology can provide integrity and restoration guarantees
for medical records. Many countries have combined the blockchain technology
with eHealth systems and achieved great success. For instance, Estonia [10]
makes use of the blockchain technology to provide patients with safer and more
convenient medical services. An ample amount of solutions, i.e. [11], [12], [13],
strive to leverage the latest technology, such as smart contracts and privacy pro-
tection modules, to enhance the operability and confidentiality of eHealth sys-
tems. Through the literature review, it would be an effective way for blockchain
to serve as a decentralized storage and replace the central servers, but there still
remain some drawbacks.
The most intractable issue is the underlying security of blockchain-based
eHealth systems. These systems treat the blockchain system as a secure and
trusted ledger in public networks. The hypothesis is unrealistic since many
well-known events about blockchain attacks in stealing blockchain properties,
malicious manipulations, double spending and exploiting bugs in smart con-
tracts [14] [15] [16] have occurred in succession. Some of these attacks target
at mining strategies and protocols, allowing attackers to obtain additional re-
wards [17] [18]. But some other attacks may be more serious for the attackers
can totally control the consensus protocols or the issuance of cryptocurrencies,
which would completely destroy the blockchain system. In order to build a ro-
bust blockchain-based eHealth system, we need to take the underlying security
of the blockchain-based eHealth system into consideration.
Trivial records are another obstacle to the development of eHealth systems.
Existing blockchain-based eHealth systems regard medical records as transac-
tions in a blockchain system. These systems utilize smart contracts and the
scripting language to exchange medical data between medical institutions with
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blockchain systems. Due to the data storage and exchange model, the medical
data are scattered in blockchain system. In this case, consulting the medical
records of patients in a mass of block data is inefficient. And obtaining a pa-
tient’s whole medical records in such systems consumes a lot of time. In addition,
some mechanisms leverage extra interfaces to integrate the medical records. e.g.
, schemes in [19] and [11] utilized smart contracts to retrieve the whole medical
histories of a patient. In this construct, users need to invoke smart contracts
frequently, which brings more gas cost for users. Worse still, attackers may ex-
ploit loopholes in the smart contracts to steal the medical records. Therefore,
we need an effective design which can integrate the medical records and make
it more convenient for patients to access their medical records.
As for the privacy of patients, most schemes default that the medical data is
controlled by medical institutions alone. Under the circumstance, patients lose
control of their medical data. What’s worse, the medical institutions may traffic
the data to lawbreakers for illegal benefits, which would violate the patients’
safety. Since the medical data is jointly generated by patients and medical
institutions, we believe that the data should be the common property of both
participants. Thus, a dual control scheme for patients and medical institutions
is desirable in the E-health time.
In terms of the above problems, we combine RepuCoin [20], the first blockchain
system that can resist 51% attacks, with the SNARKs-based chameleon hash
function [21], and propose a medical records sharing and privacy-preserving
systems based on blockchain (SPChain). Specifically, the contributions of this
paper are as follows:
• We propose a blockchain-based medical records sharing and privacy-preserving
eHealth system (SPChain). Patients in SPChain can share their medical
records among different medical institutions without registering repeat-
edly. In the case of misdiagnosis, SPChain provides special transactions
for patients to label wrong medical records. Besides, we design a dual
control scheme for participants to protect the rights of both parties.
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• We combine the SNARKs-based chameleon hash function and RepuCoin
to construct SPChain. Notably, we propose a new chain structure to
make microblocks contribute to the weight of blockchain. In addition, we
design a reputation-based reward system to incentive medical institutions
to participate in the consensus mechanism.
• We present security analysis to demonstrate that SPChain resists the
blockchain underlying attacks such as flash attacks and selfish mining at-
tacks. And the experiments prove that SPChain is practical and efficient
in terms of throughput.
1.1. Organization
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by in-
troducing some related works in Section 2. The third section is concerned
with some preliminaries we used. In Section 4, we describe the system model
and the design goals. The detailed blockchain-based medical data sharing and
privacy-preserving eHealth system is given in Section 5. Section 6 illustrates the
evaluation and security analysis of our scheme. Finally, we give the conclusion
and future work.
2. Related Works
In this section, we first review some blockchain-based eHealth systems, then
we list the drawbacks of these systems.
In order to prompt patients to engage in the details of their healthcare and
restore agency over their medical data, Azaria et al. [11] proposed a decentral-
ized record management system to handle EMRs. The system utilized smart
contracts to manage medical records of patients. With modular design, patients
can design access control rules and share their EMRs with different institutions.
The authors also designed reward system to incentive researchers and public
health authorities to participate in the network as blockchain miners.
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To preserve patients’ privacy in the process of disseminating EMRs, Xia
et la. [12] designed a system that addresses the issue of medical data sharing
among medical big data custodians in a trust-less environment. The system
employed smart contracts and an access control mechanisms to effectively trace
the behavior on the data, and revoked access to violated rules and permissions
on data. With a data custodian system, the system can monitor entities that
access data for malicious behaviors.
Cao et al. [22] proposed a secure cloud-assisted eHealth system to protect
outsourced EMRs from illegal modifications. The key idea of the system is
that the EHRs can only be outsourced by authenticated participants and each
operation on outsourced EMRs is integrated into the public blockchain as a
transaction. The system took into account the situations of a single doctor and
multiple doctors and utilized key exchange protocol to protect the privacy of
EMRs. The tamper-proofing property of blockchain guaranteed the correctness
and integrity of EMRs.
Xia et al. [13] proposed a permissioned blockchain framework to achieve
medical data sharing in cloud environments. In the scheme, the authors designed
authentication and verification protocols to set permissions and distribute keys
for users. The system permits users to request data from the shared pool after
their identities and cryptographic keys are verified.
All existing blockchain-based eHealth systems have at least one of the fol-
lowing drawbacks:
Can not resist blockchain underlying attacks. All the blockchain-
based eHealth systems do not take the blockchain underlying attacks into con-
sideration. We hold the opinion that the security of blockchain is the basic
guarantee in constructing blockchain-based eHealth systems. Natoli et al.[23]
and Bonneau et al. [24] point out that some attacks can destroy the blockchain-
based system. In this situation, the blockchain-based system no longer holds
the nature of tamper-resistant and privacy-preserving. There is no essential
difference between the blockchain system and the traditional medical system in
this way.
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Trivial records. In the most blockchain-based eHealth systems, the records
are growing horizontally, which means that the new records are attached in
the latest block. This structure leads to trivial patient records and it is not
convenient to integrate the history of patients’ records. In addition, patients
need to register and be checked repeatedly in different medical institutions.
Invoking smart contracts frequently. In some blockchain-based eHealth
systems such as [11] [25], the authors utilize smart contracts to manage med-
ical data.This design is convenient for medical institutions but not friendly to
patients, since patients need to invoke smart contracts frequently and the invo-
cation of smart contracts consumes gas in Ethereum.
Medical data centralization. Most schemes default that medical data
is controlled by medical institutions alone. In this situation, patients can not
protect their privacy since they lose control of their EMRs. In this paper, we
ensure that EMRs should be the common property of patients and medical
institutions, and participants must be approved by each other before they can
use the data.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we formally define the preliminaries used in SPChain, in-
cluding the SNARKs-based chameleon hash function and RepuCoin.
3.1. Chameleon hash function for redactable blockchain
The concept of chameleon hashing was put forward by Krawczyk and Ra-
bin [26], building on the notion of chameleon commitments. Up to now, there
are many chameleon hash function schemes which satisfy different properties,
such as Ateniese and Medeiros [27], identity-based chameleon hash function
[28] and labeled chameleon hash function [29]. However, as discussed in [30],
they are non-applicable for constructing redactable blockchains. We choose a
SNARKs-based chameleon hash function given in [21] to construct SPChain.
A key-exposure-free SNARKs-based chameleon hash is specified by a tuple
(HGen,Hash(m, hk),HVerify,Hcol) of efficient algorithms as follows:
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• HGen(1λ). Run (csr, τ)← SN.Setup(pp). Pick x R←−Zp, h2 R←−G1, and set
h1 = [x]1 and hˆ1 = [x]2. Set hk = (h1, hˆ1, h2, crs) and tk = (x).
• Hash(m, hk). For message m, pick r randomly from Zp and compute h =
hr1h
m
2 and R = g
r. Then give a proof pi for the following relation by
SN.Prove:
L =
{
(h, h1, hˆ1, h2,m) : ∃(R) : e
(
h
hm2
, [1]2
)
= e(R, hˆ1)
}
• HVerify(m, hk, (h, ζ)). Check SN.Verify(crs, h,m, pi) and output 1 if this is
correct, otherwise output 0.
• Hcol(tk, (h,m, pi),m′). First check the proof and if it is correct, then com-
pute a collision as R′ =
(
h
hm
′
2
) 1
x
. Then give a proof for the following
relation by SN.Prove:
L =
{
(h, h1, hˆ1, h2,m) : ∃(R′) : e
(
h
hm2
, [1]2
)
= e(R′, hˆ1)
}
3.2. Blockchain and RepuCoin
The blockchain is a data structure and serves as a distributed ledger in
which multiple transactions are maintained by trustless nodes in a P2P network.
Information may include data records of different types, such as cryptocurrency
transactions, smart contracts and account balances.
Typically, each block contains a hash pointer that points to its previous
block, a timestamp, and the transaction data. The block can be chained to the
blockchain, only if the validity of its transaction data is verified by a majority
of nodes. The blockchain technique can be generally classified into two types:
private (consortium) blockchain and public blockchain.
RepuCoin. Yu et al. [20] proposed a system named RepuCoin which is
the first system to tolerate attacks compromising 51% of the network’s com-
puting resources, even if such power stays maliciously seized for almost a whole
year. RepuCoin can achieve a high throughput of 10000 transactions per second
(TPS).
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The existing systems link computing power and voting rights to resist Sybil
attacks and improve the throughput of the system. But these systems are still
under some computing power-based attacks such as 51% attacks, selfish mining
attacks and so on. RepuCoin separates computing power and voting rights,
and uses a notion of reputation to define a miner’s power in terms of its work
performed over the lifetime of a blockchain. Even if the attacker has 99% of the
computing power, it cannot attack the system successfully.
RepuCoin adopts the block structure in bitcoin-NG [31] system which con-
tains keyblocks and microblocks. The formats of a keyblock and a microblock
are illustrated in Figure 1. RepuCoin proposes a weighted vote-based consensus
to constitute the consensus group. In particular, each member of the consensus
committee is given weight related to that member’s reputation. In order to
reach an agreement, RepuCoin needs both a sufficient number of votes and a
collective weight of a majority.
Figure 1: The formats of a keyblock and microblock in RepuCoin
4. System and threat model
In this section, we first present the architecture of SPChain, then list the
requirements that SPChain should satisfy. Finally, we give out the threat model.
4.1. High-level overview
As shown in Figure 2, there are two participants in our system: patients and
medical institutions. The procedure that patients consult medical institutions
in SPChain is illustrated as follows.
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Figure 2: The architecture of SPChain
Firstly, a patient P˜i sends transactions to register with medical institutions
M˜i, and provides it with auxiliary information such that M˜i generates diagnos-
ing records for P˜i. Then diagnosing records are encrypted with the symmetric
key of P˜i.
After generating the diagnosing records, P˜i generates the corresponding
transactions and sends them to the blockchain network. Then M˜i participants
in mining to gain rights to commit transactions into blocks. In return, the
winner of mining process gains rewards.
When the patient P˜i need to visit another meical institution M˜j , P˜i can
access the medical information and medical history in SPChain, and do not need
double registration. Besides, the record history in blockchain can be extended by
issuing special type transactions. In the case of misdiagnosis, patients can send
transactions to label the wrong records without influencing other transactions
in SPChain.
4.2. Design goals
SPChain consists of patient nodes and medical institution nodes. Here we
define medical institution nodes working as miners which can build reputations
by participating in consensus mechanism and dealing with the transactions.
Thus our system can adopt consortium blockchain. SPChain supports medical
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records update, label and retrieval. Within the adversary, SPChain should
satisfy the following security requirements:
• Confidentiality. The contents of EMRs should not be recovered by unau-
thorized medical institutions or attackers.
• Label and correctness. Wrong EMRs can be labeled by authorized
medical institutions and patients should be able to verify the correctness
of the labeled EMRs.
• Integrity. The integrity of EMRs should be guaranteed. Any illegal
modifications by unauthorized medical institutions should be detected by
the system.
• Privacy. In SPChain, the privacy of patients’ EMRs should be preserved.
In other words, without the permission of patients, other medical institu-
tions can not access the contents of EMRs.
4.3. Adversary model
In the adversary model, miners in SPChain are similar to those in RepuCoin.
We hold the assumption that the number of Byzantine nodes in the system does
not exceed one third of the total number of nodes. They may behave maliciously
to gain additional rewards. We will consider the attacks from two different
angles: one is in terms of blockchain system, the other is in the aspects of the
SPChain system. As for the former, we consider the 51% attack, flash attack
and selfish mining attack. For the latter, we take reputation fraud attacks and
inhibition attacks into consideration.
Blockchain attacks:
51% attacks [32] and flash attacks [24]. An attacker can obtain a temporary
majority of computing power by renting enough mining capacity, which would
break the security assumption of proof-of-work based systems.
Selfish mining attacks (block withholding attack) [18]. In this case, an at-
tacker controls a significant amount (> 25%) of mining power in the system.
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The selfish miner instead mines the block continuously maintaining its track
and fails to publish it to the network. The attacker only publishes the chain of
the transaction to increase the amount of revenue earned.
SPChain attacks:
Reputation fraud attacks. A malicious medical institution creates ”zombie”
patient nodes to increase its reputation.
Inhibition attacks. When a medical institution becomes a leader successfully,
it may only package its own transactions and ignore others’ transaction on
purpose.
5. The SPChain system
In this section, we present details describing the different concepts and mod-
ules underlying SPChain. We first introduce basic definitions about transac-
tions, blocks and chain structures. Then we detail consensus mechanism in
Section 5.2 and SPChain in Section 5.3.
5.1. Basic elements in SPChain
5.1.1. Transaction
As shown in Figure 3, there are three types of transactions in our system,
register transactions, medical transactions and label transactions. Transactions
in SPChain are presented as triplets (Type,Data, sig), where Type denotes the
type of transaction, Data identifies the contents in different types of transac-
tions, and sig specifies the signature of the transaction sender.
Register transaction. This transaction is send to the medical institution
which the patient wants to be treated at the first time. We denote a register
transaction as TR = (Register,H(ID||Age|| . . . ), sigP ), where Register speci-
fies a register transaction, H(ID||Age|| . . . ) denotes the hash value of a patient’s
identity, age and other auxiliary information, and sigP is the signature of the
patient. Every patient should send this transaction to register in SPChain.
Medical transaction. This transaction is send by patients to upload
records to the blockchain. We define an update transaction TM = (Medical, CH
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(EMEP (EMRs))||pi||Pointer, sigP ), where Medical indicates that this is a
medical transaction, CH(EMEP (EMRs)) identifies the chameleon hash value
of the encrypted EMRs while Pointer represents the pointer to the encrypted
EMRs, pi denotes the proof of generated by SN.Prove and sigP is the signature
of the patient.
Label transaction. When medical errors occurs, patients send this trans-
action to label the wrong records. We define a label transaction TM = (Label,
Hash TM , CH(EMEP (EMRs
′))||pi′||Pointer, sigP ), where Label indicates the
transaction is a label transaction, Hash TM is the transaction hash value of the
medical transaction to be labeled. CH(EMEP (EMRs
′)), pi′, Pointer and sigP
are the same as the above definitions.
In our system, register transactions are packed into keyblocks while medical
transactions and label transactions are attached to the microblocks bound to
the patients.
Figure 3: The structure of transactions in SPChain
5.1.2. Block and Chain Structure
Block. Similar to RepuCoin, there are two kinds of blocks in our system,
keyblock and microblock. Figure 4 shows the structure of a keyblock and a
microblock. Unlike RepuCoin, keyblocks contain register transactions in our
system. We use Prev keyblock hash and last microblock hash to mine key-
blocks and we will detail mining strategy in the following part.
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Figure 4: The structure of blocks in SPChain
In our system we regard a microblock as a patient block. From Figure 4
we can see that every patient holds one and only one microblock which stores
the whole medical records of the patient in different medical institutions. In
order to facilitate the retrieval of records, we use merkle tree structure to con-
struct the institution hash root. To achieve modification in a patient block,
we use SNARKs-based chameleon hash function instead of SHA-256 to calcu-
late Medical institution hash root. The leaf nodes of the tree are the basic
information (for example, the public key which is certified by authority) of med-
ical institutions. Figure 5 details the calculation of hash root. There are two
cases in the calculation, an even number n and an odd number n. Medical
transactions and label transactions are attached behind the basic information
in chronological order.
Chain structure. Miners in RepuCoin and bitcoin-NG system solve bitcoin-
like puzzles to create keyblocks. The puzzle is defined as follows:
H(prev keyblock hash||Nonce||PK) < target,
where H(·) is a cryptographically secure hash function, prev keyblock hash is
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Figure 5: The calculation of hash root
the hash value of the previous keyblock, PK is the miner’s public key and target
is a target value defined by the system.
In such systems, there is no transaction data contained in keyblocks and the
microblocks do not contribute to the weight of the chain. To increase the weights
of microblocks, we design a new chain structure given in Figure 6. The inputs
of mining keyblocks include not only the hash of the last keyblock, but also the
hash of the last microblock appended to the penultimate keyblock. Thus, we
redefine the mining strategy as follows:
H(prev keyblock hash||penu microblock hash||Nonce||PK) < target,
where penu microblock hash is the hash value of the last microblock of the
penultimate keyblock.
We call a round r is a process where a keyblock and the corresponding
microblocks are generated. In each round keyblocks are the sorting index of
the following microblocks, which means the microblocks are mined in the order
of the register transactions packed in the keyblocks. When sending medical or
label transactions, patients should append rounds number to transactions to
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Figure 6: The chain structure in SPChain. From the blue arrow we can see that the input of
the keyblock i is coming from two parts, the hash value of the microblock Mi−2 and the hash
value of the keyblock i− 1. The genesis part is set by the system management.
shard them in the consensus group.
To mitigate the fork problem, we use the pinned blocks mentioned in Repu-
Coin. A pinned keyblock is a keyblock that is agreed upon and signed by the
consensus group. A pinned keyblock is final and canonical, and all keyblocks
that conflict with a pinned keyblock are considered invalid. Based on this def-
inition, we also define the pinned transactions. Each time the transactions are
generated by patients, the medical institutions collect the transactions sent to
themselves, and propose them to the consensus group. The group verifies the
received transactions and signs to the valid transaction. Then the medical in-
stitutions append the pinned transactions to the corresponding microblocks.
Figure 7 details the formats of a pinned keyblock and pinned transaction.
Figure 7: The formats of a pinned keyblock and a pinned transaction
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5.2. Consensus Mechanism and Reward System
Consensus mechanism. We combine proof-of-work with Byzantine agree-
ment protocol to form the consensus mechanism. Medical institutions create
keyblocks and validate transactions to gain reputation score, which decides
whether the medical institutions can join the consensus group. We choose the
X miners with the top reputations to constitute the consensus members. Re-
Table 1: The notations of reputation calculating
Symbol Description
L the length of the current blockchain;
c the size of a block chunk, i.e., the number of keyblocks contained in a
chunk, pre-defined by the system;
l l = dL
c
e is the number of keyblocks contained in a blockchain with
length L;
N the total number of the current microblocks;
T total transactions in blockchain;
TMLi the number of medical transactions and label transactions whose re-
ceiptor is miner in chunk i;
TRi the number of register transactions whose receiptor is miner in chunk
i;
H a binary presenting whether the miner is honest (”1”) or not (”0”);
meani the mean value of medical transactions and label transactions (if i =
TML) or register transactions (if i = TR) created by a miner or a
leader across all epochs in the blockchain, respectively;
si the standard deviation corresponding to meani, for i ∈ {TML, TR};
R1 reputation score defined in RepuCoin;
(a, λ) reputation system parameters.
puCoin gives a method to calculate the reputation score R1 by evaluating the
frequency of miners creating keyblocks and microblocks. In our system, we pro-
pose another method to calculate the reputation score R2. In our reputation
algorithm, we assess the number of patients and The notions are defined in
Table 1 and R2 is calculated in Algorithm 1. The final reputation score of a
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medical institution is defined as R = 12 (R1 +R2).
Algorithm 1 The reputation algorithm
Input: L, c, l, TRi, TMLi, R1, a and λ
Output: The miners’ reputation R2 ∈ [0, 1].
1: meanTR =
∑l
i=1 TRi
N
2: meanTML =
∑l
i=1 TMLi
T
3: sTR =
√
1
l ·
∑l
i=1(
TR
c −
∑l
i=1 TRi
N )
2
4: sTML =
√
1
l ·
∑l
i=1(
TML
c −
∑l
i=1 TMLi
T )
2
5: q1 =
meanTR
1+sTR
6: q2 =
meanTML
1+sTML
7: x = q1 · q2 · L
8: f(x) = 12 (1 +
x−a
λ+|x−a| )
9: R2 = min(1, H · f(x))
10: R = 12 (R1 +R2)
Reward system. In SPChain there are two types of rewards, transaction
fees and mining rewards. Medical institution can define the determined amount
of different type transactions. After mining a pinned keyblock successfully, the
miner can get a reward contained the predefined mining rewards and the register
transaction fees in the keyblock. The same as keyblock rewards, microblock re-
wards also contain mining rewards and transaction fees, which are shared among
the reputable miners who creat the microblocks and verify the transactions.
5.3. SPChain
By utilizing the transactions, blocks, chain structure and consensus mech-
anism given above, we propose the blockchain-based medical data sharing and
privacy-preserving system, we call it SPChain. Figure 8 details the orchestration
of SPChain. The system consists of the following algorithms, Setup, Register,
Upload, Label and Share.
Setup. This algorithm takes public parameters as inputs, and outputs sym-
metric encryption key pair K, bitcoin public-private key pair (PK,SK) and
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address address PK for patients and medical institutions. In addition, the al-
gorithm also initializes the SNARKs-based chameleon hash function parameters
for medical institutions.
• Patients: K ← AES(seed),
{(PK,SK)||address PK} ← Bitcoin(rand).
• Medical institutions:
K ← AES(seed),
{(PK,SK)||address PK} ← Bitcoin(rand),
{hk = (h1, hˆ1, h2, crs), tk = (x)} ← HGen(1λ).
Figure 8: The orchestration of SPChain
Register. In this algorithm, patients send register transactions to the medical
institutions to register in our system.
(1) Patient i˜ sends register transaction TR to medical institution C˜. The
transaction contains the proper register fees to C˜.
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(2) Medical institutions (miners) collect register transactions and pack them
into keyblocks. Then Medical institutions propose keyblocks to consensus group.
(3) The consensus group verifies the validity of the keyblocks, and runs
Byzantine agreement protocol to decide which keyblock is the final pinned key-
block (if multiple conflicting keyblocks are proposed). Then the reputable miner
is selected to commit microblocks according to the register transactions in the
keyblock.
Upload. The serial number (4)-(6) given in Figure ?? illustrate the process of
a patient uploading the medical records. There are three cases in this algorithm,
patient j˜ is diagnosed in medical institution A˜ for the first time; patient j˜
updates EMRs in the same medical institution A˜; or patient j˜ is diagnosed in
another department of medical institution B˜. We describe the three cases in
detail in Figure 9.
Figure 9: The three cases in Upload
Case 1: Patient j˜ is diagnosed in medical institution A˜ for the first time.
(4′) Patient j˜ registers in the system and is diagnosed in medical institution
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A. Then A generates EMR for j˜ and the EMR is successively encrypted in the
following formulas,
EKj˜ (EMR)
Kj˜←−− EMR,
CH(EKA˜(EKj˜ (EMR))
KA˜←−− EKj˜ (EMR),
(CH(EKA˜(EKj˜ (EMR))||pi)
h1,hˆ1,h2,crs←−−−−−−−− EKA˜(EKj˜ (EMR)).
After that, the patients j˜ generates transaction TMj˜ and send it to the
medical institution A˜. Note that the ciphertext EKA˜(EKj˜ (EMR) is stored in
the database of medical institution A˜.
(5′) The consensus group classifies these transactions in several rounds ac-
cording to the round numbers, and verifies the transactions proportionally ac-
cording to the reputation score.
(6′) The consensus group verifies the validity of the transactions and signs to
them. To become pinned transactions, the transactions should not only get two-
thirds of signatures, but also get more than two-thirds of the reputation. Here
we can use aggregate signature to reduce the cost. Then the medical institution
A˜ appends the pinned transaction to the microblock Pj˜ .
Case 2: Patient j˜ updates EMRs in the same medical institution A˜.
In this case, patient j˜ goes to the medical institution A˜ for treatment again
and updates the EMRs on the basis of Case 1.
(4′′) A˜ generates EMR∗ for j˜ and invoke algorithms in Upload to get
EKA˜(EKj˜ (EMR
∗)), CH(EKA˜(EKj˜ (EMR
∗))) and pi∗.
(5′′) Patient j˜ generates transaction T ∗Mj˜ and sends it to medical institution
A˜. Then the consensus group validates T ∗Mj˜ and signs it.
(6′′) After the transaction T ∗Mj˜ is pinned, medical institution A˜ appends the
transaction to the microblock Pj˜ .
Case 3: Patient j˜ is diagnosed in another department of medical institution
B˜.
(4′′′) B˜ generates EMR′ for j˜ and invoke algorithms in Upload to get
EKB˜ (EKj˜ (EMR
′)), CH(EKB˜ (EKj˜ (EMR
′))) and pi′.
(5′′′) Patient j˜ generates transaction T ′Mj˜ and sends it to medical institution
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B˜. Then the consensus group validates T ′Mj˜ and signs it.
(6′′′) After the transaction T ′Mj˜ is pinned, medical institution B˜ appends the
transaction to the microblock Pj˜ .
Label. In this algorithm, patient j˜ labels the wrong EMRs in the case of
misdiagnosis.
(7) In this case, the transaction which contains the wrong EMR should be
labeled by a label transaction. B˜ generates the correct EMR′′ for j˜ and invoke
algorithms in Upload to get EKB˜ (EKj˜ (EMR
′′)), CH(EKB˜ (EKj˜ (EMR
′′))) and
pi′′.
(8) Patient j˜ generates transaction TLj˜ and sends it to medical institution
B˜. Then the consensus group validates TLj˜ and signs it.
(9) Finally the pinned transaction TLj˜ labels the wrong transaction in mi-
croblock Pj˜ . And patients can verify the new transaction through the new proof
pi′′.
Share. This algorithm is illustrated as follows:
(10) Patient j˜ wants to go to medical institution D˜ for diagnosis. j˜ can
access the corresponding transaction records he/she wants to share to D˜, i.e. j˜
wants to share his/her medical records of medical institution A˜ with D˜ to get a
better diagnosis. j˜ asks A˜ to decrypt the cipher text with the key KA˜. Then j˜
decrypts the result with Kj˜ and obtain the EMR. Thus j˜ can obtain the entire
history of diagnosis.
6. Evaluation and security analysis.
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of SPChain, then we discuss
whether SPChain can fulfill the requirements and prevent attacks proposed in
Section 4.
6.1. Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of SPChain in terms of throughput. We test
our system on a computer with windows 10 system, an intel(R) core(TM) i5-
6500 CPU, and 16 GB DDR 4 of RAM.
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Figure 10: The throughput of SPChain (keyblocks)
Throughput.In this part we analyze the maximum throughput of our sys-
tem. We assume the consensus group controls 90% computing power. Since
keyblocks in SPChain contain register transactions, so we analyze the through-
put in terms of keyblocks and microblocks. From Figure 10 we can see that the
keyblock throughput is similar to that of bitcoin systems since they are under
the same mining strategy. And when fix the block size to 4MB, the system
has higher throughput than that of 1MB and 2MB. As for microblocks, our
results in Figure 11 show that when the block size is fixed, as the number of
consensus nodes increases, throughput decreases gradually. For example, with
the block size 1MB, the through decreases from 145 TPS to 116 TPS. Besides,
from Figure 11 we can see that when fix the block size to 2MB, the system
has higher throughput than that of 1MB and 4MB. In particular, when the
consensus group consists of 4 nodes, the through can reach 218 TPS.
Reputation score and consensus time. We simulate the reputation cores
of medical institutions by choosing the top 15 mining pools given in [20]. We
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Figure 11: The throughput of SPChain (microblocks)
set the parameter a = 5000 and λ = 20000. Figure 12 describes the distribution
of miners with different reputation scores over time. With the operation of
SPChain, the reputation score of miners increase gradually, and ehe higher
computing power the miner holds, the higher the reputation score it receives.
We now compare the performance of our system with other blockchain-based
eHealth systems. From Table 2 we can see that BBDS, MeDshare and MedRec
can not label wrong EMRs in the case of misdiagnosis. And these systems are
vulnerable to blockchain underlying attacks such as flash attacks and selfish min-
ing attacks. From the table we can conclude that SPChain can resist blockchain
underlying attacks while achieving medical data sharing and privacy-preserving.
6.2. Security
In this section, we first discuss whether SPChain can fulfill the requirements
proposed in Section 4.2. Then we describe in details how SPChain prevents
attacks proposed in Section 4.3.
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Figure 12: The throughput of SPChain (keyblocks)
Table 2: Comparison between existing blockchain-based eHealth systems and SPChain
Scheme Share Privacy Label wrong records Flash attacks Selfish mining attacks
BBDS X X × × ×
MeDshare X X × × ×
MedRec X × × × ×
SPChain X X X X X
6.2.1. Property analysis
SPChain focuses primarily on four properties: confidentiality, privacy, mod-
ification, correctness and integrity .
Confidentiality and privacy. SPChain guarantees the confidentiality of
patients’ EMRs. Note that the EMRs are encrypted sequentially by the pa-
tients and medical institutions with their symmetric keys. And the inputs of
chameleon hash function are the ciphertext of EMRs. In this circumstance, the
medical institution which generates the EMRs can not share the records with
other medical institutions since they don’t have the symmetric keys of patients.
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When verifying the accuracy of the chameleon hash value, the verifier receives
the ciphertext of the EMRs, which won’t leak the privacy of patients either. So
we claim that SPChain guarantees the confidentiality of the EMRs and preserves
the privacy of patients.
Label and correctness. SPChain permits medical institutions to label
wrong EMRs and allows patients to verify the correctness of the modified
records. In the case of misdiagnosis, patients can ask authorized medical in-
stitutions to label the wrong EMRs with the label transaction and to generate
the correct EMRs corresponding to the label transaction. With the proof pi,
patients can invoke HV erify to check whether the modification is correct.
Integrity. SPChain provides integrity guarantee of patients’ EMRs. The
medical institutions that hold the trapdoor x can tamper the contents of the
EMRs without changing the corresponding chameleon hash value. But with the
proof pi, the patients can verify the correctness and integrity of the EMRs. Thus
any modifications on the EMRs can be detected by the patients, so we conclude
that SPChain guarantees the integrity of the EMRs.
6.2.2. Defense against attacks
This section discusses defences of the attacks mentioned in Section 4.3.
51% attacks and flash attacks. SPChain is resilient to flash attacks.
Although an attacker can gain temporary majority of computing power, the
attack also need a very long period of time to gain reputation to harm the sys-
tem. According to RepuCoin, an attacker that joins after 1.5 years of system
operation would need to have more than 90% of the system’s computing power
for 6 months to successfully attack the system. And even the attacker success-
fully attacks the system, he/she will lose all reputation he/she has gained since
he/she joined the system.
Selfish mining attacks (block withholding attacks). SPChain pins
each keyblock, and the pinned keyblocks can not be roll back. Every new
created keyblock is chained behind the pinned keyblocks. So if an attacker
publishes a keyblock which is conflict with the pinned keyblock, he/she can not
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get advantage of gaining rewards over the honest miners because the keyblock
he/she publishes would not be admitted by the system. When mining a new
keyblock, the miners need to take the hash value of the previous keyblock and
the last microblock of the penultimate keyblock as inputs. Since there is no
conflict when generating microblocks, we do not need to consider the microblock
withholding attacks. In summary, SPChain can resist selfish mining attacks.
Reputation fraud attacks. A malicious medical institution controls a
group of ”zombie” patients to generate fake transactions to cheat the system.
In this way, the malicious medical institutions can gain extra reputation. In
SPChain, we stipulate that every transaction contains a fixed service fee and
transaction fee. The stipulation can crease the cost of reputation fraud attacks.
If necessary, we advice that patients can register with their ID card.
Inhibition attacks. A medical institution in consensus group may inten-
tionally ignore the transactions of other medical institutions. In this case, the
consensus group always verify their own transactions first, which can increase
their reputation in an unfair way. We stipulate that the transactions of medical
institutions are verified proportionally according to the reputation. We illus-
trate the notations of reputation calculating in Table 3 and detail the transaction
processing algorithm to resist inhibition attacks in Algorithm 2.
Table 3: The notations of reputation calculating
Symbol Description
mi the i-th medical institution;
Ti the transaction set of mi;
G the consensus group;
n the total number of the medical institutions;
Ri the reputation score of mi;
∆ the time interval;
k a nonce;
Tm the maximum number of transactions processed by consensus group at
a time;
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Algorithm 2 Transaction processing algorithm
Input: mi, Ri, Ti, k, p =
∑k
i=1 |Ti|, P =
∑k
i=1 Ti, ∆ and G.
Output: The pinned transaction set T .
1: mi sends Ti within ∆ to G
2: G collects Ti and forms a table B = [T1, . . . , Tn]
3: G selects ti ∈ Ti according to reputation ranking , where ti = 10bRic
4: Case 1: k ≤ N
G picks Ti from B until p =
∑k
i=1 |Ti|
5: Case 2: k > N
G picks transactions from the beginning medical institution until p =∑k
i=1 |Ti|
6: P is the final verified set T
7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we consider misdiagnosis and data sharing in medical sce-
narios. Based on RepuCoin and SNARKs-based chameleon hash function, we
have proposed a medical data sharing and privacy-preserving system. In our
system, patients can share their EMRs among different medical institutions in
privacy-preserving way. Besides, in the case of misdiagnosis, patients can ask
the authorized medical institutions to amend the wrong records. We design
reputation-based consensus mechanism and reward system to guarantee that
SPChian can resist the blockchain underlying attacks. We have conducted a
comprehensive performance and security analysis of our system, which proves
that SPChain is practical and efficient in terms of throughput.
For the future work, we intend to reduce the patients’ communication over-
head and to future improve the throughput of our system.
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